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Sea Power and China’s 
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No Turning Back
China’s national goals have shifted from the need to guarantee its survival 
during the country’s revolutionary days to the current state of  securing stable 
economic development. This shift marks a full transition for China, changing 
from a closed country to a developing one that is irrevocably integrated with 
the rest of  the world. Today, while this subject is a common discourse in 
scholarly and political circles, the international community is still coming to 
grips with the meaning and impact of  China’s evolving role on the world 
stage. It is not an easy issue and extends beyond economics.
With external trade accounting for almost 50 percent of  China’s economy, 
China is now highly interdependent with a globalized market.1  This shift 
also includes hard social, political and geopolitical choices that deeply impact 
matters of  national security. The more developed China becomes the greater 
its dependence grows not only on foreign trade but also on the resources 
to fuel the economy. With these complex and expanding interests, risks to 
China’s well-being has not lessened but has actually increased, making China’s 
national security at once both stronger and more vulnerable.
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The year 2004 marked the inauguration of  the Chinese government’s 
national development goal of  “building a balanced, well-off  society”. With 
sustained high economic growth rates, China holds great potential to fulfill 
this grand aim for its population of  1.3 billion people. Achieving this goal 
would also raise China’s status as a player on the international stage. But these 
national objectives have also locked China into a development path from 
which there is no turning back. China must continue to move forward, for if  
it does not, the economy’s productive force could turn into a destructive one 
that leads to chaos and even violent civil unrest. Maintaining China’s economic 
juggernaut not only requires continuing participation in the global market but 
it also depends on access to energy and other resources.2 
How can sufficient resources be guaranteed to satisfy China’s rapid and 
stable economic growth?  Addressing this question holds immense challenges 
both for China and the international community.
Equal Rights
A stable energy supply is the key driving force for China’s secure long-
term economic growth. But China is not achieving that due to a number 
of  important structural contradictions in its energy consumption pattern. A 
sustainable development model should be one where productivity rises as 
resource consumption falls. Currently, however, China’s productivity is rising 
while resources are being consumed even faster. China cannot maintain an 
economy whose energy intensity continues to increase. Such a state of  affairs 
invariably leads to significant ecological degradation. If  the cost of  restoring 
the damage to the environment offsets the gains in GDP growth, what has 
China gained? This is not a healthy way to economically develop. It may be 
tolerable in the short-term but cannot be viable in the long-term.
The second and closely related contradiction is that while China’s hunger 
for resources increases, its access to resources outside its own borders has 
not grown in tandem. The West praises the Chinese for being a hardworking 
people, contributing hugely to the global economic growth. In 2003, China 
accounted for just 3.89 percent of  the global GDP but it contributed to 15 
percent of  the GDP growth of  the world.3 Yet, an industrious society also 
requires more food. It is almost as if  China is expected to work harder on 
less sustenance. China makes contributions to the world but does not receive 
an equal share of  its resources. This is not congruent with the international 
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China will not always have 
sufficient natural resources to 
sustain its present participation 
in the world economy.
democratic principle of  reciprocity between rights and responsibilities. China 
will not always have sufficient natural resources to sustain its present partici-
pation in the world economy.4  Equally sharing in the global resources is the 
international democratic right to which China is entitled.
On balance, China is presently consuming its own resources in its role 
as the “factory of  the world”. Resource shortages are rapidly becoming a 
bottleneck to China’s development. The only way out of  this predicament is 
for China to go to the world and rightfully 
claim its share of  international resources.
This is particularly true of  China’s need 
for energy resources. Yet, the irrational dis-
tribution of  energy is forcibly maintained 
under the present international order, 
which is marked by war and conflict. Prior 
to World War II, the world’s center of  energy demand and consumption was in 
Europe and the United States. However, following the oil crises of  the 1970s 
and 1980s, the base of  industrial power began to shift toward Asian countries, 
especially Northeast Asia. Now this region claims the highest demand for oil, 
though it has critically insufficient oil reserves available for consumption. 
However, China currently does not possess the ability to safeguard its 
equal right to energy in the world. Some say that as long as one has money, 
resources can always be bought. But, this neglects the reality that wealth and 
access to resources go hand-in-hand with politics and military affairs. 
Security Lags Behind Dependency
The confluence of  geopolitics and resource politics has become a basic 
feature of  the international system. The degree of  resource shortage world-
wide is proportional to the level of  tension between big powers. Where there 
is a scarcity of  resources, geopolitics is at play. The latter has a direct bearing 
on China’s survival and development since the country’s oil consumption is 
almost 50 percent reliant on imports. China’s dependence on international 
energy imports is rapidly changing from a relationship of  relative dependence 
to one of  absolute dependence. China cannot have control over development 
goals without corresponding control over the resources to fuel the economy. 
The simple fact is that China does not possess that control. More than half  
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of  U.S. oil imports are shipped via the sea lanes.5  The crucial difference is that 
China is almost helpless to protect its overseas oil import routes. This is an 
Achilles heel to contemporary China, as it has forced China to entrust its fate 
(stable markets and access to resources) to others. Therefore, it is imperative 
that China, as a nation, pay attention to its maritime security and the means 
to defend its interests through sea power (a critical capability in which China 
currently lags behind). 
Some observers note that China’s overseas trade is presently develop-
ing smoothly and there is no need for sea power. However, the question is 
whether this can be considered development with any guarantee. If  one day, 
another nation(s) finds an excuse to embargo China, what can China do? 
Any substantial blockage of  its foreign trade-dependent economy and/or its 
energy supply could gravely imperil China.
The history of  capitalism and its spread globally have shown that it is often 
accompanied by cruel competition between nation states. Those countries that 
lose out are not necessarily economically or technologically underdeveloped 
or those with a low level of  culture. Rather, they are most often those nations 
who forgo the need to apply their national strength to national defense and 
therefore do not possess sufficient strategic capability. 
Wealth itself  does not naturally endow a nation with ample security. Before 
the Industrial Revolution, the British were far poorer than the Chinese.6  In 
terms of  GNP alone, China accounted for 32.4 percent of  the world’s total 
in 1820, some 1.2 times greater than all of  Europe. Yet, in 1840, only 20 years 
later, China was roundly defeated by Britain. Again, in 1890, although China 
had 5.3 times the GNP of  Japan, China did not prevail in the Sino-Japanese 
war just five years later.7 
Independent of  wealth, a guarantee of  access to global trade and resources 
necessarily requires sufficient power to defend one’s interest in the trade and 
resource transportation sea routes. Economic globalization entails globaliza-
tion of  the military means for self-defense, because the national defense must 
go where a nation’s economic interests lie.
Protecting Border Security and Security Boundary
In international politics, the idea of  security naturally expands alongside 
national interests, not merely its geography.  The security of  one’s sovereign 
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territory and a notion of  greater national security (interests not necessarily 
within a country’s physical territory) are related, but fundamentally different. 
They can easily be confused and should be thought of  as a country’s “border 
security” versus its “security boundary”.
In the past, China’s national security was largely confined to border security 
because it did not have many global interests. Rather, China’s core concern 
was one of  survival. With this overriding goal, protecting the homeland and 
winning a war depended on luring the 
enemy into the hinterland. This was a vi-
able strategy when China had little inside 
its border to lose. Today, even if  national 
security were similarly confined to China’s 
territory, such a strategy would be im-
possible as the whole eastern region of  China is the engine of  the national 
economy. Luring the enemy into China would invariably mean the destruction 
of  China’s prosperous eastern seaboard and the core of  its economic power. 
Thus, safeguarding China’s territorial borders requires a broader concept of  
security.
Today, China’s core national security not only narrowly centers on survival 
but includes a broader development goal which extends beyond the nation’s 
territory. Indeed, China’s national interests – writ large – are especially rel-
evant to the nation’s economic development, and may not only involve all 
the regions of  the world but could even include outer space. This gives rise 
to the concept of  a nation’s “security boundary”, which is a nation’s security 
concerns over all of  its national interests, including those beyond its own 
borders. Many of  China’s political and economic interests have been widely 
integrated into the world and therefore its security boundary is much more 
broadly defined than its border security.
Often, the extension of  a country’s security boundary is equated to the 
expansion of  its territorial border, thereby creating a threat. In fact, this is 
incorrect. All countries that enter the global market economy have interests 
outside the scope of  its territorial border.  Once a nation state takes part 
in globalization, it has the right to protect those national interests that have 
been integrated into the world. The territorial borders of  the United States, 
even in an expansive sense, are only limited to North America. Yet, because 
of  its powerful political, economic and military strength, America’s national 
Safeguarding China’s territorial 
borders requires a broader 
concept of  security.
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security boundary covers virtually the whole globe. China has a territorial 
border roughly the same in size as that of  the United States. However, the 
security boundary China is capable of  protecting does not reach beyond its 
own territory and is far more limited than the United States due to a deficient 
military capability overseas.
A security boundary is the boundary of  one’s interests. Wherever China’s 
interests lead, there too must follow China’s capabilities to protect those in-
terests. And as the nation’s economic interests expand into the global market, 
China must consider the problem of  safeguarding its global and regional 
interests. The most crucial conduit connecting China with the region and 
with the rest of  the world is the sea lanes, and therefore, China must have a 
powerful navy. The oil imports that China consumes from Africa, the Middle 
East and Central Asia will mainly pass through these sea lanes. China’s trade 
is also 90 percent dependent on sea lane transport. If  all goes well and other 
nations behave fairly, China will certainly act in accordance with WTO rules. 
But what if  others don’t act so fairly? It is 
not difficult for the West to find a pretext 
to impose sanctions on China. The Yinhe 
incident in 1993 is a classic case of  how 
the United States has attempted to make 
an issue out of  nothing.8  Precisely because 
China’s navy did not have the capability to 
resist, China had little choice but to let them 
board the ship to make the so-called inspections. In an era when development 
is the core national interest, China would secure nothing if  it did not have a 
strong navy. 
The determining factor shaping the rise and fall of  a country ultimately 
is not just the size of  its total economic volume but also the strategic ability 
of  the country; that is, the ability to use national forces to achieve political 
goals. Many cases in history have shown that the main reason for a country to 
be strong is more than a rise in prosperity or technological advancement but 
the effective application of  such technology and wealth in national politics, 
especially military power.
The benefits of  attaining such capabilities are often not apparent in the 
short term. The immediate costs of  unifying the country during the American 
Civil War were very dear in blood and treasure. In the long term, however, 
The rise and fall of  a country 
ultimately depends on a 
country’s ability to use national 
forces to achieve political goals.
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Lincoln laid a foundation for the United States that has made it the great 
nation it is today. When Mao Zedong decided to build an atomic bomb, the 
sacrifice made at a number of  levels in order to successfully complete such 
a project was enormous for China at the time. In the long term, however, 
China obtained over 30 years of  peace and security to develop as a nation. It 
is imperative to view the significance of  economic growth and technological 
progress from a political angle. If  national economic force cannot be effec-
tively turned into national political force, it will lose its positive significance.
In the current era, where maritime transportation is a key factor to success 
of  the flow of  goods and commodities for the globalized economy, a power-
ful navy able to effectively control the sea passages will receive increasingly 
greater attention by all nations, particularly China. Thus, a necessary question 
to answer is how should China seek to protect its own growing security inter-
ests regarding these vital sea lanes?
Unifying Sea Rights and Sea Power
Sea power has determined the fate of  nations. China is no exception. In 
the past, China’s slow but sure descent into a divided, colonized state at the 
hands of  foreign powers was – to a considerable extent – due to its failure as 
a naval power. The two Opium Wars in 1840 and 1854 respectively, as well as 
the Sino-Japanese War of  1895, are examples showing China’s crucial defeats 
at sea, which ultimately led to its failure as a state. The delay of  resolving the 
Taiwan issue is also largely because of  China’s insufficient sea power.
Opinions in China are greatly divided on whether or not, and if  so, how 
China should strive for sea power. Given both the nature of  global inter-
dependence and the disastrous naval defeats of  certain countries in history, 
some have put forward that it is unnecessary for China to emphasize sea 
power in the process of  economic development. Others have stressed the 
importance of  vastly strengthening China’s navy in order to vie with other 
naval powers for hegemony. However, both views are inaccurate. China’s sea 
power is uniquely defined. A traditional Western notion of  sea power is the 
ability to control the sea, while China’s concept of  sea power is a marriage of  
the notion of  equal sea rights and sea power. In the latter, the application of  
power on the seas cannot exceed the former but rather should serve the aim 
and scope of  a nation’s sea rights. 
Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choices
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If  “sea right” is the natural extension of  the concept of  “national 
sovereignty”, then “sea power” is limited to the means to preserving a nation’s 
interests at sea. Two points are worth noting here. First, in a fundamentally 
anarchic international political system, sea rights are often exercised through 
sea power and therefore people unconsciously confuse the two. Naturally, 
these ideas are linked, but they are really two completely different concepts. 
Sea power is only the means to achieve sea right, not sea right itself.9  Second, 
a nation’s sea power is also an important medium to transform sea rights 
into sea hegemony. Hegemony is the act of  one country manipulating and 
controlling others’ behavior by dint of  its strength.10  Such influence or domi-
nation is separate from a fair and lawful sea right, which any country naturally 
possesses. 
A sea right is a national right that only sovereign states are entitled to 
and can exercise according to international law. Sea power is in fact a neutral 
concept though it has come to mean a capability at sea through which one 
can compel others by force. In the international community, only the United 
Nations or countries and bodies authorized by the United Nations are quali-
fied to use such force.11  
Control over the sea may hold the balance regarding the survival of  a 
nation. While this statement may sound arbitrary, it undoubtedly conveys 
the fate of  some great powers in the past, for example, when the United 
States became independent in the late 18th century the young nation regarded 
strength on the sea as its lifeblood. India is perhaps the most vivid example of  
the importance of  sea power. The Indian Ocean is at the center of  the world 
geopolitical system and India is the primary power in its orbit. Over a period 
of  several centuries, the Indian Ocean was 
first controlled by Iberian countries and 
then by the British Empire, which forced 
India to become a British colony due to its 
failed sea power. This humiliating course of  
history impelled India’s first Prime Minister, 
Jawaharlal Nehru, to articulate that India, 
constituted as she is, cannot play a secondary role in the world. She will either 
count for a great deal or not count at all. A middle position is not an option 
for India.12  Some ascribe a hegemonic tendency to these thoughts but they 
are in fact, no more than a deep concern of  India’s unique position in a 
China’s concept of  sea power 
is a marriage of  the notion of  
equal sea rights and sea power.
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geostrategic location. If  India cannot establish an effective national security 
shield in this geopolitically central zone, namely the Indian Ocean, then it will 
never have a secure future.13  
Is China in the same boat? Is there a particular geostrategic water mass 
that China must control or face the prospect of  being controlled? What are 
the limits of  that strategic goal? What are the contents and scope of  China’s 
sea rights?
The Limits of  Sea Power
In the near to medium term, unifying Taiwan with the motherland and 
recovering China’s sovereign islands is both the great historical mission that 
the Chinese government must shoulder and a necessary foundation for China 
to safeguard its national sea rights. Therefore, within the context of  these 
imperatives, the significance of  China expanding its naval power can never 
be overestimated. Whether these goals are realized peacefully or otherwise, 
the Chinese navy’s future military role in unifying the country will be of  great 
importance. In this sense, and only within the scope of  national sovereignty, 
the expansion of  China’s sea power is unlimited. 
The Taiwan issue not only involves the issue of  China’s sovereignty; over 
the long run, it is also very relevant to the problem of  gaining sea power 
which will determine the fate of  China’s development. If  China loses Taiwan, 
it will subsequently also lose the Nansha Islands (Spratleys) and perhaps the 
Diaoyu Islands. Losing these regions implies that China will lack the basic 
space for ensuring national political and economic security that will be es-
sential to China’s rise as a great power. That is because the center of  gravity 
of  China’s national economy has shifted to the southeastern region, whose 
economy is spearheading China’s great development drive. Given this, China’s 
security boundary cannot be limited to its southeastern coast. If  Taiwan and 
other islands are not within China’s control, China will not be able to guaran-
tee the border security of  commercial centers such as Shanghai, Guangzhou 
and Shenzhen. 
Beyond the above objective however, China’s sea power and the expansion 
of  its navy are limited. This is because many issues relevant to international 
maritime rights need to be resolved through multilateral consultations within 
the framework of  international laws of  the sea. The goal of  the Chinese navy 
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in this environment is merely to ensure the lawful execution of  multi-party 
discussion outcomes. From this perspective, China’s sea power is fundamen-
tally peaceful and Chinese naval build-up is confined to the role of  providing 
self-defense and deterrence. The goal of  a strong Chinese navy will always be 
to afford China the ability to independently stand up for its rights in the world 
on an equal footing with others. 
Know Thy Self
This paper has discussed the nature of  China’s irreversible joining of  the 
global system, China’s right and necessity to protect its evolving interests 
in that system and the limitations of  those goals. This has caused a varying 
degree of  anxiety amongst certain nations regionally and globally. Thus it is 
important to address how China envisions its position in the world, and how 
China will wield its growing power and influence. 
Profoundly relevant to this issue are the lessons from history that China 
has garnered and internalized. History shows that the rise and fall of  great 
powers principally depends on how they exercised national power and influ-
ence outside their sovereign borders. The demise of  all such powers in history 
has resulted from their succumbing to the temptation of  excessive expansion. 
When one considers China’s need for world resources, its growing national 
strength and the need for a strong navy to protect its interests, does this not 
mean that China’s military capabilities will also expand out of  control in the 
future?
Absolutely not! If  China’s modernization drive entails worldwide expan-
sion, even unwarranted regional expansion, it will be the nation’s road to 
disaster. In fact, the 50-year development goal that Deng Xiaoping set out for 
China’s future was to become a “medium-developed” country. In this way, he 
has positioned China as a regional power for the foreseeable future. China’s 
influence in the world is essentially realized through a regional framework. 
In this way, China is fundamentally different from the United States, whose 
outlook in terms of  power and influence is organically global in nature.
One way such differences are manifested is by the culture and character 
of  each country’s respective defense establishment. For instance, U.S. mili-
tary exercises always take on some major country in the world and face an 
imagined opponent on a battlefield in a foreign land such as the Red Sea, 
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powers in history has resulted 
from their succumbing to 
the temptation of  excessive 
expansion.
the Panama Canal, the South China Sea or Okinawa. Chinese soldiers, on 
the other hand, traditionally view their role as protecting the homeland and 
envision the battleground as Shanhaiguan, Wuhan or the Yangtze River. In 
fact, the American experience may have taught China that its military should 
indeed have a greater outward orienta-
tion. Furthermore, China’s future security 
policies need to change from the policy 
of  defending the home territory to the 
policy of  maintaining what China has 
already accomplished regionally; from 
an inward-looking policy of  keeping to 
its own affairs to a policy of  outward ac-
tive defense. However, China should of  
course concentrate on Asia, maintaining friendly relations with its neighbors, 
and thus laying a meaningful foundation for its long-term future.
Beyond this, any further ambitions are curbed by the profound lessons 
China has taken from the events such as the fall of  Germany in the last cen-
tury and the current U.S. predicament in Iraq. 
The Crucial Lessons of  History
The study of  German history and the great success of  Otto von Bismarck 
alongside the failure of  Wilhelm II are especially instructional. Bismarck saw 
an opportunity to unite the German provinces using dynastic wars and a 
complex system of  regional and international cross alliances. His brilliance 
however, lies less in the accomplishment of  unifying the German Empire, 
than in his understanding that Germany had to limit its own ambitions to 
regional power and influence, despite its ascendancy at the time. Bismarck 
was not only able to deter France and others from destroying the newly uni-
fied Germany, but he was able to maintain a relative stability in Europe by 
imposing a self-restraint on Germany’s ambitions beyond its borders and the 
region.14 
Bismarck’s foreign policy of  strategic self-control led to a rapid rise in 
Germany’s national strength, a state of  affairs that dramatically changed after 
he stepped down as chancellor in 1890 in favor of  Wilhelm II. The new em-
peror reversed Bismarck’s foreign policy and unwisely yielded to Germany’s 
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impulse for worldwide expansion driven by the rise of  its national strength 
and pride. Certainly the fortunes of  Germany go beyond the actions of  two 
single leaders, nevertheless the latter period introduced the large scale ex-
pansion of  German nationalism and its military might regionally and further 
abroad.15  These adventures increased direct confrontation with other powers 
in the world, including France, Russia, the United States and Britain. Treaties 
to confine Germany’s growing ambitions were formed between almost all 
of  the major powers. The rest is history as 
Germany was defeated and nearly destroyed 
as a nation through the two World Wars.
These historical experiences on the 
European continent are apropos of  China’s 
future. The essence of  Bismarck’s foreign 
policy is to not fear challenges to one’s na-
tional sovereignty and be bold in resorting 
to force if  necessary. Beyond that, however, 
involvement in international issues is com-
plex and fraught with grave risks.  Any country must grasp a delicate balance 
of  pursuing its interests and avoid overdrawing its national strength in great-
power competition. In short, China will seek regional influence not global 
domination because this is in China’s own interest and a matter of  survival.
The more recent history of  the United States is also a poignant lesson 
for China. After joining the ranks of  world powers in the middle of  the 20th 
Century, the United States has begun to witness the decline of  its national 
fortune, which is closely related to its policy of  pursuing world hegemony.
America’s superior economic strength came into ascendancy following 
World War II and has slowly evolved into a global expansion of  its military 
might, especially sea power. This process began with control of  the Pacific 
Ocean when the U.S. Joint Chiefs of  Staff  drew up a westward “frontier” 
migration plan in 1946. According to the plan, the 7th Fleet of  the U.S. Navy 
entered Japan and occupied the Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands. With Asia’s 
largest navy based in Okinawa, the United States continued by occupying the 
Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands in 1947.  However, this expansion met 
with serious setbacks in the Korean Peninsula and Indochina.16  In the 1950s, 
the United States suffered heavy losses in Korea when fighting with China. In 
the mid-1960s, after France withdrew from Vietnam, the United States hast-
Any country must grasp a 
delicate balance of  pursuing 
its interests and avoid 
overdrawing its national 
strength in great power 
competition.
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ily entered Indochina to shoulder the burden of  “salvaging the democratic 
world”. The result was the quagmire known as the Vietnam War.
It was during this period that America’s world expansion began to consume 
its national strength. In 1960, the United States accounted for 25.9 percent 
of  the world’s total output value but dropped to 23 percent in 1970 and 21.5 
percent in 1980. Meanwhile, countries like Japan witnessed a quick rise in 
their share of  the world’s total output. Its share rose from 4.5 percent to 9.0 
percent of  the world’s total between 1960 and 1980, while China’s increased 
to 4.5 percent from 3.1 percent over the same period. Nixon saw the drop in 
U.S. national strength as a result of  overseas expansion and decisively altered 
U.S. foreign policy by ending the Vietnam War and normalizing relations with 
China. U.S. national strength began to rise once again until the end of  the 
Cold War. Although its arch enemy, the Soviet Union fell apart, the United 
States resumed its expansionist foreign policy. Through the first Gulf  War in 
1991, the Kosovo War in 1999, the Afghanistan War in 2001 and its present 
occupation of  Iraq, the United States has installed its military forces into 
the Gulf  Region, the Balkan Peninsula and Central Asia, fully displacing the 
geopolitical ambit of  the Soviet Union. Moreover, the United States withdrew 
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, permanently altering the global 
strategic balance.17 
Under the present administration of  George W. Bush, the United States 
has clearly become the international hegemon. America has not learned the 
painful lessons of  the past. This is abundantly clear as America becomes 
increasingly bogged down in its Iraq campaign. It is also true in its treatment 
of  China. The dynamic between China and the United States today is closely 
reminiscent of  the 19th century, when Britain attempted to keep a young 
America under control. Those painful memories of  struggling to find its place 
under British domination have been forgotten. As China grows out of  its 
isolation and attains greater influence internationally, there is a very real risk 
that the United States will repeat the mistakes of  past great powers, and try 
to contain China. How relations between China and the United States in this 
context will play out is of  critical importance in the near and medium future. 
Perhaps a greater lesson for China is how it will make its own choices as 
it rises in power and influence. The history of  past empires shows us that no 
great power has been able to resist the temptation of  worldwide expansion to 
the point of  overstretch. Yet, a country can only remain strong if  it restrains 
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